Chapter IX

Containing strictures on some late publications.

The following remarks are not communicated for the sake of exposing the inconsistencies of my respected christian brethren; but with the desire, that (by convincing each other of the impropriety of any of our present views,) we may be more united in the holy truth.

In Mr. Miller's third Letter on Unitarianism, he asks, "Where, then, is the absurdity or contradiction of an eternal necessary emanation from him, (God the Father) or, if you please, an eternal generation?" To this, Mr. Stuart, in his Letters to Mr. Miller, (p. 78,) replies; "The scriptures then, as you aver, have left the three fold mode of existence unexplained. May I be permitted to ask, now, if teaching the doctrine of the eternal and necessary emanation or generation of the son of God, (whom as Son you view to be the second person in the Trinity,) be not attempting an explanation of a subject, which the sacred writers leave unexplained? Is not existence or subsistence by emanation, a mode of existence?"

I would now respectfully ask Mr. Stuart, if teaching the doctrine of three persons in one God, "be not attempting an explanation of a subject which the sacred writers leave unexplained?" Is not existence by plurality of persons a mode of existence? Are not the wordsthree persons in the Godhead, an attempted definition of that very distinction in the Deity which you acknowledge to be "indefinable?"

Mr. Miller also remarks, "That mystery should be readily allowed to exist every where in God's creation, and in God's providence, and at the same time be unceremoniously rejected from God's revelation, is more than strange!" To this, Mr. Stuart, (p. 88) replies in the following excellent manner: "The cry of mystery, mystery, which is so often raised against certain doctrines of the scriptures, can never influence the real lover of truth to reject them. But what is unintelligible, or surpasses our comprehension, belongs to things and not to words. What we express respecting things, must of course be intelligible; for language is merely the vehicle by which our thoughts are conveyed to others. What we understand in our own minds, we can express to the mind of others; and what we do not understand, of course we cannot express, because our language, which is only the vehicle by which our thoughts are conveyed, cannot convey thoughts or conceptions which do not exist. It is very easy then, to draw the line of distinction, between mystery which is connected with things or phenomena, and mystery which belongs only to language. The latter, I take it, always proceeds either from want of skill, or crafty design, or an intention to speak enigmas. We are not allowed, therefore, by the common laws of language, to assert any thing which, when examined, proves to be either a contradiction, or an incongruity; and then to take refuge from objections which may be made to our language, under the pretence that the subject is mysterious, and consequently, it is improper to urge investigation respecting it. It may be true, indeed, that the subject of which we speak is mysterious. But what I have expressed about such a subject, if I have used language with any propriety, is, of course, only what I knew or conceived about it in my own mind. This can certainly be made intelligible to another mind; and there is, therefore, no mystery in my expression; at least there ought to be none."

After this just and lucid distinction between words unintelligible and things indefinable, if I ask Mr. Stuart what is that distinction of which he speaks, when he says, there are three persons in the Godhead; can he consistently answer, "I do not know?"¹ Mr. Stuart, indeed says, "we speak of person in the Godhead, to express that which in some respect or other corresponds to persons, as applied to men, that is, some distinction." I reply, the term as applied to men signifies distinct beings; does he use it in this sense? Mr. Stuart will answer, certainly not. I ask Mr. Stuart then, (for his own principles authorize me to pursue the enquiry,) In what sense, as the term is applied to men, do you use it in application to the Deity? I wish to know what ideas any person has in his mind corresponding with his declaration, that there are three persons in one God; a declaration no where to be found in the scriptures. It is true, "the subject of which we speak is mysterious. But what I have expressed about such a subject, if I have used language with any propriety, is, of course, only what I knew or conceived about it in my own mind. This can certainly be made intelligible to another mind; and there is, therefore, no mystery in my expression; at least there ought to be none."

If the scriptures reveal any distinction in "the only true God," let it be stated in "the words which the Holy Ghost teacheth." But to use expressions on this important subject, of which we have no corresponding ideas in our own minds, is certainly to "darken counsel with words without knowledge." Mr. Stuart himself says, (p. 34,) Letters to Mr. Channing, "I could heartily wish, indeed, that the word person never had come into the symbols of the churches." Yet he says, "it is perhaps inexpedient or even impossible altogether to reject it." So long, indeed, as we prefer the words which man's wisdom teacheth, to those which the Holy Ghost teacheth, it will probably be retained. I would however respectfully request my dear brother Stuart if he continues to use it, to inform us whether the mystery of the language proceeds "from want of skill, or an intention to speak enigmas?" Of "crafty design" I would not suspect him a moment.

Mr. Stuart remarks to Mr. Miller, on the subject of eternal generation, (p. 81,) "To understand how the same numerical essence can be said to communicate the whole of itself to the same numerical essence, I must give over in despair, to intellects of a different order from that which I possess." But I ask, is this any more unintelligible than Mr. Stuart's definition of John 1:1, which supposes thatthe same numerical essence was with the same numerical essence? Page 36, Letters to Mr. Channing, Mr. Stuart refers the terms " sending and being sent" to the first and second persons in the Godhead. Accordingly, he represents that the same numerical essence sent and was sent by the same numerical essence! Is this any more intelligible? Or, can any proposition be more unintelligible than the following?The same numerical essence, prayed to the same numerical essence to be glorified with the glory which he had with the same numerical essence before the world was. To any one who possesses intellects capable of understanding this, I should think the sentiment of Mr. Miller can present no difficulty.

Mr. Stuart says, (p. 92,) "The Logos is really and verily divine, self-existent, uncaused, immutable in himself." Mr. Miller, (p. 107) remarks, "If this be true of the Logos, it is also true of the other persons. But if this be so, are there not three Gods?" To avoid this difficulty, Mr. Miller who is also a zealous Trinitarian, denies that either of the persons possess complete divinity. The inspired apostle indeed assures us that "there is but one God the Father." Mr. Miller's system obviously denies this divine testimony. His words are, "as I understand this subject the three persons of the blessed Trinity together constitute one self-existent, independent and infinitely perfect God." Again he says, "We cannot say that each person possesses in himself complete separate and independent divinity."² It appears then, that all the censure that Mr. Miller has passed on those who deny the complete and independent divinity of the Son of God, falls upon himself. If Mr. Miller supposes, I hat according to Mr. Stuart's views, there are three Gods; may not Mr. S. infer from Mr. M's system that there is no God at all?

Does not the system of that writer clearly represent the one God as divisible? When he conceives of the Father, in distinction from the Son and Holy Spirit, must he not conceive of him, (I ask with reverence and regret) as one third of the infinite Deity? How revolting to the intelligent mind is such a theory! Mr. Miller also supposes that the divine persons in the Godhead are distinguished from each other "by an incommunicable property." (p. 36.) If so, it necessarily follows, that the distinguishing properties or perfections of the second and third persons are not possessed by the first; consequently, the Father is not infinitely perfect.

I rejoice that I am able to close these strictures with a quotation from Mr. Stuart, which manifests the triumphant victory of his good sense, at one happy moment, over an erroneous system. He assures Mr. Channing, (p. 114,) that it "is incorrect, — to represent them (Trinitarians) as holding that Jesus Christ is the 'same being as the Father,' if you mean by this, in all respects the same." Certainly this is synonymous with saying, that he is in some respect another and distinct being. Let this concession then, suffice to terminate the controversy with Mr. Stuart concerning the doctrine of the Trinity.